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Abstract
We propose that a coherent and thoroughgoing version of realism, known as situational
realism, offers a unifying programme for psychology. This realism emerges from the
conditions of being that enable knowledge and discourse. Because this research
originated largely in a century’s work by Australian psychologists and philosophers, we
will introduce and explain research and vocabulary that might be unfamiliar to some
readers. The approach is characterised by seven themes: ontological egalitarianism;
situational complexity and process orientation; a network or field view of causality; a
realist logic; a view of relations as nonconstitutive; an externalist relational approach to
mind; and acceptance of critical inquiry as the core scientific method. The combination of
these features offers psychology the following: a metatheoretical framework that resolves
current tensions; expansion into the field of meanings and reintegration with
hermeneutics and semiotics; clarification and redirection of mainstream cognitive
neuroscience and information processing; an integrative approach to personality;
expansion, redirection and unification of psychological research methods; and revision
and expansion in psychological practice and teaching.
Keywords: realism, situational realism, unifying psychology, metatheory, integration
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Unifying Psychology Through Situational Realism
Most mainstream psychologists would consider themselves realists: There is an
objective world that includes human minds and behaviour, and these can be investigated
scientifically. They would also be aware of opposition to this realist stance, mainly from
those outside the mainstream favouring qualitative methods and relativist or
constructionist philosophical approaches. However, there are many varieties of realism
(cf. Archer et al., 1998; Harré, 1986; Hartwig, 2007; Varela & Harré, 2007), and some
have greater potential than others for bridging divides within the wider field of
psychology. We argue that a coherent and thoroughgoing approach is achieved in
situational realism (Mackay and Petocz, 2011a); its themes fit together without
contradiction and apply without compromise. The failure to systematically adopt such a
realism explains many of psychology’s difficulties, and helps explain the expanding
ranks of dissatisfied and disaffected psychologists (cf. Toomela & Valsiner, 2010). It is
unfortunate, therefore, that this realism is “probably the least known” of realisms
(Greenwood, 2007, p. 605); it is confused with the other types of realism and is
sometimes confused with generic positivism (cf. Hibberd, 2007, 2010). Situational
realism defines psychology as the study of those organism-environment relations and
interactions (dynamical systems) that involve the psychological categories cognition,
motivation and emotion. This realism deserves to be better known, not least for its ability
to resolve age-old tensions and unify psychology.
We will discuss briefly the historical origins of this approach, and identify and explain
its seven key interrelated features or principles. We will then lay out the unifying
programme for psychology offered by this realism, ranging across theory, research and
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teaching. Finally, we will address briefly the question how this approach relates to other
unifying approaches.
Background, Major Themes and Extension to Psychology
Situational realism is not the work of a single individual, but its core is in the system
developed by the Scottish-Australian philosopher John Anderson (1893-1962), Challis
Professor of Philosophy (initially including psychology) at Sydney University from 1927
to 1958: hence Andersonian, Sydney or Australian realism (for a reader-friendly account
see Baker, 19861). More recently, the term situational realism has been adopted
(Hibberd, 2007, 2009; Mackay & Petocz, 2011a2) as better reflecting realism’s central
theme (see later) and its wider historical roots in the ancient Greek, British (particularly
Scottish) and American realist traditions. Situational realism combines strands of
thinking from pre-Socratic (especially Heraclitean) and Aristotelian philosophy, from
Thomas Reid and the Australian-English philosopher Samuel Alexander, from William
James and the American New Realists, E. B. Holt, R. B. Perry, and others (e.g., Holt et
al., 1912). It has similarities to the (independently developed) direct realist ecological
approach of the perceptual psychologist J. J. Gibson (Gibson, 1966, 1979), and it fits with
more recent radical (i.e., direct realist) embodied cognitive science (Chemero, 2009) and
the revival of neorealism (Tonneau, 2004).
Realism is a kind of “first principles” approach whose themes emerge from what
Anderson called the “conditions of discourse” (1927a/1962, p. 11), which are revealed to
be also the conditions of existence, of facts. Hence realism is not so much a “theory” or a
1

Also Grave, 1984; Mackie, 1962; Passmore, 1962, 1977; Anderson’s essays in Anderson (1962), and his
lecture notes and other material at the University of Sydney’s “John Anderson Archive” at
http://adc.library.usyd.edu.au/index.jsp?database=anderson&collection=anderson&page=home
2
Although we there followed the tradition of favouring the unqualified term “realism”, the existence of
alternative versions of realism prompts us, for clarity’s sake, to follow recent convention.

SITUATIONAL REALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY

5

“new paradigm” as the very precondition of discourse and understanding (Stove, 1991).
For realism, “metaphysics” is not a dirty word, because it is not about an unknowable
reality behind experience; it is about the reality that is already in and required by
experience (cf. Baker, 1986, pp. 95ff; Groarke, 2009).
Situational realism is characterised by a set of interconnected features or principles, as
summarised in Table 1.
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Table 1
Seven Features/Principles of Situational Realism

Feature/principle

Description

1. Ontological egalitarianism

There are no philosophically privileged elements of “being” that are
more real than others. There are only complex spatio-temporal
situations. There are no “levels” of reality and traditional dualisms
are invalid (e.g., matter/spirit, free/determined, universal/particular).

2. Situational complexity and
process orientation

Reality is a collection of infinitely complex situations. Situations are
complex spatio-temporal occurrences that are always in process,
always historically and contextually embedded.

3. Network or field view of
causality

Situations arise from antecedent conditions, but causality is not a
simple two-term linear (cause-effect) sequence. Causality is a
complex three-term relation (cause, causal field or conditions,
effect). Within the causal field things have their characteristic ways
of working, by which they are constrained and, in turn, constrain
other things.

4. Realist logic

Logic is not an abstract language or calculus or laws of thought. It
deals with the laws of things, with the general forms of situations
and with relations of implication between situations.

5. Relations as nonconstitutive

Everything is related (spatially, temporally, causally, etc.) to other
things. Those relations are always external to the things related and
cannot be found in them. Nothing is (partially or wholly) constituted
by its relations with other things.

6. Externalist relational view
of mind/mentality

There is no such thing as mind; mind/mentality is a particular kind of
relation between a subject (organism/person/knower) and the object
(situation that is known). Thus, mind is not internal to brain, and the
objects of mental relations (whether veridical or nonveridical) are
external to the subject.

7. Science as critical inquiry

Science investigates natural (including human) systems. It is
premised on recognition of cognitive fallibility. Its core feature is not
experimentation or mathematisation or measurement, but critical
inquiry—careful, systematic investigation, employing best available
error-detection mechanisms, testing hypotheses via both logical and
observational tests.

Note. Although some of these features occur in other (realist and nonrealist) approaches, we take the
combination and systematic interlinking of all seven to be distinctive of situational realism.
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Situational realism first influenced philosophy (e.g., Armstrong, 1968, 1997, 2010;
Mackie, 1974; Passmore, 1970; Place, 1956; Smart, 1959; Stove, 1981, 1991), then
extended to psychology, developing into a strong tradition, mainly at the University of
Sydney (e.g., Henry, 2009; Hibberd, 2005; Maze, 1983a; McMullen, 1996, 2001;
Michell, 1988; O’Neil, 1957, 1968, 1987; Sutcliffe, 1993). Realist work in psychology
was vigorously pursued, but its publication was scattered and piecemeal over several
decades.
Recently, we systematically collated its themes into a 900-page collection of 23 essays
old and new, and presented them as a clear and recognisable position in psychology
(Mackay & Petocz, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). This collection contains discussion of many
topics, including the themes listed in Table 1: historical development and contemporary
relevance (Hibberd, 2009); the state of theory in psychology (Mackay & Petocz, 2011b);
direct realism and cognition as a relation between knower and known (Anderson,
1927b/1962; Michell, 1988); attitudes and moral beliefs (Maze, 1973); mental causation
(Medlow, 2011); a motivational theory of drives and consummatory actions (Maze,
1983b; Newbery, 2011); drives and affects in personality theory (McIlwain, 2007);
mental plurality (Boag, 2005); how and why concepts are “out there” and not “in here”
(McMullen, 2011); category, concept and class (Sutcliffe, 1993); representationism
versus realism (Maze, 1991); the problem of false beliefs, hallucinations and other forms
of error (Rantzen, 1993); social constructionism and deconstructionism (Maze, 2001); a
realist reply to Gergen’s social constructionism (Hibberd, 2002); psychotherapy and
accounts of meaning (Mackay, 2003a, 2003b); symbolism (Petocz, 2011a); realism and
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cultural studies (Bell, 2003); measurement in psychology (Michell, 2000); qualitative
research in psychology (Michell, 2004); and science and meaning in the scientistpractitioner model of treatment (Petocz, 2004).
When these discussions become too philosophical, the practising experimentalist often
wonders what this all has to do with them, or, if they are thinking more pragmatically,
what do we think they should be doing instead. To this, we have answered: “it really does
all depend” (Mackay & Petocz, 2011a, p. 879, emphasis in original). One reviewer of the
book (Swami, 2012) asks for “a more thoroughgoing reply” that provides an “explicit
transitional programme” (pp. 264-5). In the rest of this paper, we shall focus on realism’s
unifying promise and programme for psychology.
Situational Realism’s Unifying Programme for Psychology
The programme consists of: a metatheoretical framework that resolves current
tensions; expansion into the field of meanings by reintegration with the traditional
methods of studying meaning, hermeneutics and semiotics; clarification and redirection
of mainstream cognitive neuroscience and information processing; an integrative
approach to personality; expansion, redirection and unification of psychological research
methods; and revision and expansion in psychological practice and teaching.
A Metatheoretical Framework that Resolves Current Tensions
Ostensibly psychology is non-Cartesian, having replaced Cartesian matter/spirit
dualism with a realist materialism. Yet it remains trapped in a subtle and persistent
Cartesianism (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, p. 111; Leahey, 2004, p. 141).
A number of new movements of expansion and integration present their proposals as
part of “an anti-Cartesian turn” (Wheeler, 2005, p. 16). These include second generation
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cognitive science (Kövecses, 2005), embodied-embedded cognitive science (Gallagher,
2005; Wheeler, 2005), evolutionary psychology (Buss, 2005), evolutionary social
psychology (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005), affective neuroscience (Panksepp, 1998),
developmental neuro-psychoanalysis (Schore, 2003a, 2003b), and cognitive semiotics
(Andreassan, Brandt & Vang, 2007; Donald & Andreassan, 2007; Jorna & van Heusden,
1998). Proponents searching for a “new theoretical framework” insist that it will not be
Cartesian, but some are explicitly unsure what this alternative framework could be. The
Cartesian legacy remains, hampering the kind of integration that is justifiably sought (see
Petocz, 2011a, pp. 609-612; 2011b, pp. 107-111).
Situational realism resolves this by “going right back beyond the Cartesian starting
points, of dualism in metaphysics, and representationism in epistemology” (Stove, 1991,
p. 102). From the principles listed in Table 1, realism involves redefinitions of
psychology’s key terms and subject matter. Instead of the current textbook definition of
psychology as the study of mind and behaviour, realism defines psychology as the study
of those organism-environment relations and interactions (dynamical systems) that
involve the psychological categories cognition, motivation and emotion. Instead of
cognition as the internal processing of information, realism defines cognition (in all
modalities, and whether conscious or unconscious) as a particular kind of relation
between organism and its environment (cf. Michell, 2011). The subject term of this
relation is a brain connected to its sensory apparatus – hence, an embodied brain.3 Instead
of defining motivation teleogically, realism defines motivation as the energising and
directing “biological engines” of the organism, connected to attachment systems and to
3

This excludes computers as currently conceived, although in principle there is no reason why a nonorganic system could not be a cogniser; the critical issue is whether a system is in fact sensitive to the full
structure of environmental situations (see below and Michell, 2011).
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the organism’s cognitive apparatus (e.g., the Darwinian-derived Freudian instinctual
drives) (cf. Maze, 1983a; Newbery, 2011). Instead of emotion/affect as the internal
registration of the state of the body, realism defines emotion/affect either as a complex
combination of cognition and motivation rooted in drive-ancillary structures, or as driveequivalent motivational structures (McIlwain, 2007).4 Cognition (in all of its modes) is
never disinterested, because embedded in the cognitive situation is the motivated subjectterm of the cognitive relation. Being an external relation, cognition is observable in the
guiding of the organism’s movements during its behavioural actions (Michell, 2011).
Thus behaviour is not mere mindless movement, it is inextricably cognitive (Maze,
1983a). Furthermore, the cognitive situation is embedded in its social and historical
context; “Individual psychology”, as Freud put it, “is at the same time social psychology
as well” (1921/1955, p. 69). Thus, to study cognition, motivation and emotion, the
researcher must not only include both terms (i.e., subject and object) of the relevant
relations, but also examine the interactions between those relations and others, including
the causal and contextual conditions under which the relations and their interactions take
place (we expand on this general theme below).
These realist revisions of psychology’s key terms are combined with challenging the
long-held gulf between “science” and “meaning” in psychology, a legacy of the
presumed gap between Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften. Phenomena in
both groups are part of the same reality, and enjoy the same ontological status--that of
complex situations occurring in space and time--and are equally open to the core
scientific method of critical inquiry that encompasses both hermeneutic and causal

4

As we note (Mackay & Petocz, 2011a, p. 877), the nature and role of emotion/affect is debated amongst
realist thinkers (cf. Anderson, 1934/1962; Boag, 2008; McMullen, 1996).
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questions. Realism charts a course for psychology between mainstream scientism and
postmodernist antiscience (cf. Haack, 2003; Petocz, 2001, 2004).
Research in the Field of Meanings and Reintegration with Hermeneutics and
Semiotics
If meanings (in their different manifestations) are real relational situations involving
humans and other cognising organisms (e.g., X means Y to person P), and are equally
part of the causal structure of the world, then they comprise an essential part of the
subject matter of psychology. Realism thus embraces the study of meanings and prompts
re-thinking the place of hermeneutics and semiotics, the traditional disciplines studying
meaning, in psychology. Regarding hermeneutics, realism rehabilitates questions of
meaning and qualitative methods of hermeneutic inquiry within its broader conception of
scientific method (Mackay, 2003a, 2003b). Regarding semiotics, realism assists recent
attempts to integrate semiotics and psychology by first clarifying the irreducible tripartite
relational nature of meaning. This distinguishes the legitimate concerns of representation
in the information sciences (e.g., what are the most efficient ways to design auditory
warnings for artificial environments – see Petocz, Keller & Stevens, 2008) from
incoherent epistemological representationism (representations in the brain cannot be
genuine symbols - see below; also Michell, 1988; Petocz, 2011b, pp. 119-121).
Psychological research can then proceed into investigating how different types of sign
(icons or pictures, indicators, symbolic substitutes, etc.) can solve problems in
information representation research. For example, in the field of auditory warnings, some
types of sound-event mappings are readily learned, whereas others that are expected to be
easily learned are not (see Petocz et al., 2008). The research door is also opened onto the
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field of conceptual metaphor (e.g., Gibbs, 2011; Kövecses, 2010; Lakoff & Johnson,
1999), which stands on the frontier of embodiment approaches (e.g., Clark, 1997;
Gallagher, 2005) and “second generation cognitive science” (e.g., Kövecses, 2005). In
conceptual metaphor, we think of abstract concepts (e.g., mind, love, time) in terms of
more concrete or bodily experience (mind is a container, love is a journey, time is a
moving object). Thus, the whole field of signs, symbols, metaphors and meanings is
brought into the domain of primary bodily and motivational experiences (see Petocz,
1999, 2011a, 2011b).
Clarification and Redirection of Mainstream Cognitive Neuroscience and
Information Processing
Situational realism is antireductionist (Table 1: 1, 2, 5, 6). The brain is only one part of
the mental relation, and so is necessary, but not by itself sufficient for psychology.
Neither the mental relation, nor, a fortiori, mental “processes” and “structures” can be
found in the brain; experiences do not happen in brains, and concepts are to be found “out
there” not “in here” (McMullen, 2011). This has implications for the dominant
computational information-processing model and the interpretation of neurophysiological
data in psychology’s experimental heartland. Rather than the mind being the brain’s
software, with mind and brain being different “levels” of a spatially coextensive unit,
mind extends into the brain’s environment: “no theory of the brain alone will be
applicable to the combined brain-body-environment system (Chemero, 2009, pp. 178).
Psychology is reducible to neuroscience only if the psychological is confined to the head
and the environment is mentally represented. But the computer model of the brain/mind
is misguided (Michell, 1988) and the representationism supposedly derived from it is
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logically incoherent (Bickhard, 1996; Heil, 1981; McMullen, 2012). Neurophysiological
data give us only correlative information about the state of the subject when it stands in
particular psychological relations, not a picture of the physical instantiation of
consciousness, which extends across the whole organism-environment system.
Realism thus “cashes out” the metaphors of information processing, as being
statements about what in the environment is perceived, responded to, remembered, etc.
(cf. Tonneau, 2004). For example, memory is neither an internal mechanism or store, nor
the direct accessing of an internal token of a past event (cf. McMullen, 2012); the
difference between the “stores” of “short-term” versus “long-term” is a difference
between what is remembered – recent versus more distant events. There is no “problem”
of knowledge or consciousness, no “binding problem”, no “problem of mental
causation”, nor is psychology threatened by imminent “tectonic collision with
neuroscience” (Lloyd, 2010, p. 1). Instead, experimental cognitive and perceptual
psychologists can join those who are already investigating empirical questions within a
coherent realist framework (e.g., Best, 1995; Best & Tyler, 2007; see also Chemero,
2009, pp. 195-7).
An Integrative Approach to Personality
Personality (despite efforts to restrict it to “individual differences”) is that specific
area that incorporates and attempts to connect all other areas in psychology. Thus Hall
and Lindzey (1970) maintain, “we are willing to accept any general theory of human
behaviour as a theory of personality” (p. ix). Recently there have been complaints that
“personality psychology … continues to retreat from its unique historical mission … to
provide an integrative framework for understanding the whole person.” (McAdams &
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Pals, 2006, p. 204, emphasis in original). Instead, textbooks present “a parade of
alternative grand theories” founded upon incompatible “first principles” (i.e.,
assumptions about human nature), with no attempt at overall integration. Worse, “the
grand theories are faith-based systems whose first principles are untested and untestable”,
so that “choosing a grand theory to believe in may boil down to deciding which first
principle simply ‘feels right’ ” (p. 205). Mayer (1998, 2001) agrees that the grand
theories are speculative and lack research, but adds that the narrower empirical research
approaches (e.g., the trait approach) are directionless and lack theoretical grounding.
Situational realism questions the notion that the major theories’ incompatible
assumptions are “untestable”. Realism’s broader view of science recognises the
legitimacy and primacy of logical testing (cf. Petocz & Newbery, 2010). Thus, the
assumptions of different personality theories can be critically examined to establish a
coherent theoretical foundation for a comprehensive, integrated theory incorporating the
compatible strengths of the various theories. Such an integrated theory, resting on the
realist revisions of key psychological terms and the realist combination of hermeneutic
and causal inquiry, overlaps with Freudian psychoanalytic theory and coherently grounds
empirical research (cf. Boag, 2012; Maze,1983a; McIlwain, 2007, 2009; Newbery,
2012a; Petocz, 1999; Westen, 1998).
Expansion, Redirection and Unification of Psychological Research Methods
Realism’s broader view of science as critical inquiry and its equal acceptance of
relational, qualitative and quantitative structures brings unification to psychological
research methods. This potential can be realized via a sequence of methodological
expansion, redirection and further expansion.
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First, the notion of scientific method is expanded to include conceptual analysis
(Machado & Silva, 2007) and theoretical research, both as primary in the testing
process; that is, we must recognize as a methodological first-principle that an incoherent
or conceptually flawed theory cannot be empirically tested (Petocz & Newbery, 2010).
Once they are accepted as a crucial part of the scientific process, conceptual analysis
leads to further expanding psychology’s conception of scientific method by revealing that
qualitative approaches are both legitimate and warranted (Bryman, 1988; Michell, 2004).
Specific methods must be determined by, and appropriately attuned to, the nature of the
subject matter under investigation – based on empirical examination of successes and
failures. A new attention to conceptual analysis also redirects psychology’s research
attention onto the various confused assumptions about probability, evidence, induction,
generalisation, validity, etc. that underlie psychology’s quantitative and statistical dataanalytic practices (Groarke, 2009; Michell, 1990, 1997, 2009a, 2009b; Petocz &
Newbery, 2010). There is compelling evidence that psychology must reconsider its
special-purpose approach to measurement; the psychological variables that are
“measured” via rating scales rarely appear to meet the mathematical criterion for being
“quantitative”, and are not measureable in a proper scientific sense (see Michell, 2010).
While such observations are usually seen as nihilistic attempts to end psychological
research, nothing could be further from the truth here. Acceptance of the non-quantitative
character of many phenomena of interest to psychologists will further redirect research
efforts by pointing out the work to be done in following two important research paths:
testing hypotheses regarding quantitativity (and hence measurability) of psychological
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variables (Michell, 2000); and exploring the relatively untapped field of nonquantitative
structures (causal, logical, semantic, algebraic, categorical, etc.) (Michell, 2001).
Finally, realism unifies psychology’s research methods in three important ways. First,
all methods are united under the umbrella notion of science as critical inquiry; theoretical
research and conceptual analysis apply across the board and throughout the research
process (Cohen & Nagel, 1934; Petocz & Newbery, 2010). Second, realism resolves
current debates regarding how best to enrich psychology’s narrow conception of
scientific method. For example, Machado and Silva (2007) propose to reintroduce
conceptual analysis, whereas Haig (2008) replies that we should instead be focusing on
developing new theories of scientific method, such as extending induction to abduction
and incorporating Bayesian analysis into the hypothetico-deductive method (Haig, 2005).
But conceptual analysis is not merely a linguistic or grammatical enterprise; it deals with
the logical structures of real situations, so is already central to scientific method, and
already includes what Haig deems to be an alternative. Third, realism resolves the
quantitative/qualitative debate by exposing underlying confusions. It has been shown
repeatedly that, though the mainstream of the field claims to be realist and quantitative,
they implicitly pursue antirealist, positivist, practices that are at odds with the realism of
the physical sciences that they wish to emulate (Gigerenzer, 1987; Grayson, 1988, 1998;
Michell, 2000, 2001, 2009b; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989; Rozeboom, 1960). The
qualitative nonmainstream’s commitment to antirealist relativism and constructionism is
undermined by the fact that they accept and use qualitative methods that rest on realist
assumptions (cf. Bell, 2010; Hibberd, 2001, 2002; Michell, 2003; Petocz & Newbery,
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2010). Situational realism thus rehabilitates qualitative research methods into scientific
psychology without the tension created in most current attempts at integration.
Revision and Expansion in Psychological Practice and Teaching
Psychological practice is based on the North American scientist-practitioner model
(cf. Belar & Perry, 1991). Psychologists are taught to be scientists first, then
practitioners; practice must be scientifically based, implementing only those interventions
that are evidence-based and derived from sound theory and rigorous empirical research.
But this model is only as good as its underlying conception of science. Situational
realism’s broader approach to science as critical inquiry incorporates theoretical research,
conceptual analysis, re-examination of measurement and expansion into qualitative
methods. Its focus on situational complexity and process orientation promotes
contextualism and attunement to individual differences, suggesting greater flexibility in
psychological treatment approaches. For example, it entails the validity of hermeneutic
inquiry and thus fosters a scientific version of psychodynamic theory and therapy
(Shedler, 2010). Realism’s network or field approach to causality fits with the evidence
suggesting that the “active ingredients” in psychotherapeutic intervention may not be
those typically nominated by proponents of specific theories. For example, as King et al.
(2010) urge, “it is time for those universities that have not already done so to move
beyond the convenient but intellectually dishonest position that CBT is the only
evidence-based psychotherapy” (p. 4). All this points to reinterpretation and expansion of
the science basis of the scientist-practitioner model of training, and expansion of what are
accepted as evidence-based interventions (Mace, Moorey & Roberts, 2001; Petocz,
2004).
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Regarding the teaching of psychology, situational realism’s major implication is the
adoption of a nondogmatic approach, reflecting the controversies and uncertainties in the
field, and encouraging critical inquiry, examination of assumptions and creativity in the
development of new methods (Newbery, 2012b). Consistent with realism’s contextualism
and process orientation, a developmental approach would be taken in all areas of
psychology. Hence, the teaching curriculum would expand to include the history and
philosophy not just of psychology, but also of science. Then the curriculum would focus
on theory and meta-theory, conceptual analysis, and critical thinking. In particular, the
teaching of research methods would be expanded to reflect realism’s impact: students
would learn that “research” includes theoretical research, and that testing theories or
hypotheses requires logical tests to be passed before empirical tests are warranted;
qualitative and quantitative methods would be taught under the single umbrella of science
as critical inquiry (cf. Bryman, 1988), and not separately by different teachers positioned
on either side of an ideological divide; students would learn about the various
assumptions underlying statistical methods of analysis, probability, evidence and their
interrelationships, including the socio-historical, political and ideological factors behind
psychology’s adoption of various methods; they would learn how to test hypotheses
concerning quantitativity; they would learn existing qualitative methods and be
encouraged to explore novel approaches to nonquantitative structures. Moreover, the
teaching of psychology would include psychology’s interdisciplinary context, with
appropriate acknowledgment of cross-disciplinary themes and interdisciplinary
connections. Students would recognise psychology as the “self-reflexive discipline” par
excellence. By becoming aware of the “powerful impact of disciplinary socialization
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practices” in psychology (Good, 2007, p. 286), such as those that currently exclude
theoretical research from funding, students would be better prepared to take the discipline
forward.
Why Situational Realism?
With unification now on the agenda for psychology (cf. Cleeremans, 2012; Lloyd,
2010), there is a smorgasbord of offerings for psychologists. Why, then, should
psychologists adopt situational realism? What makes it, in our opinion, the healthiest
option, despite its initially unpalatable aspects, such as deflationist revisions of claims in
neuropsychology, or the limitation of quantitative methods and statistics to their
realistically determined domains of application? The simple answer is that to pursue
psychology scientifically one must adopt this realism or fall ultimately into contradiction
(Mackay & Petocz, 2011a). But coherence isn’t enough, so it is important to note that
realism also has enough scope and depth to form a basis for the field. As such, it
integrates the traditional areas of psychology (cognition, learning, personality,
motivation, social, abnormal, etc.) while also sustaining a number of other unifying
approaches (albeit some suitably modified): behavioural and perceptual approaches;
evolutionary, developmental, contextualist, historical and dynamical systems approaches;
embodiment, process-oriented, ecological and enactivist approaches; and semiotic,
hermeneutic, phenomenological and cultural approaches.
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